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Abstract
The presence of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) can beneﬁt local economies.
In particular, if MNEs are very productive compared to domestic ﬁrms, they may
promote learning and catch-up of local ﬁrms. Such a channel of spillovers from MNEs
to local ﬁrms is known as the Veblen-Geschenkron eﬀect. Rather than the overall
density of MNEs in a region or sector, it is their initial productivity advantage on the
local ﬁrm to determine the positive eﬀect on domestic productivity growth. We test
this hypothesis using ﬁrm level data for German and Italian companies during the
90ies and we ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant and robust Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect.
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11 Introduction
As the interest for the phenomenon of “globalization” grows among social scientists and
media communicators the study of multinational enterprises (MNEs), probably the most
recognizable symbol of globalization, attracts a lot of interest. Economists and policy
makers strive to answer the question: do foreign direct investments (FDI) beneﬁto rh a r m
the local economy? Through what channles do positive and negative eﬀects operate?
Theoretically can be argued either way. On one hand multinationals could be an im-
portant vehicle for technology transfer to a country (Findlay [16], Das [11], and Wang and
Blomström [52]), they could beneﬁt local suppliers and local consumers (Rodriguez-Clare
[46] and Markusen and Venables [43]) and they could increase the human capital of the
local labor force (Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde [18], and Glass and Saggi [23], [22]). On the
other hand, they could out-compete local ﬁrms forcing them out of production without
employing local labor because of skill mis-match (Aitken and Harrison [1]). The theoret-
ical literature provides structure and proposes determinants of spillovers but ultimately
only the empirical analysis can answer the question. So far, the evidence has been am-
biguous depending on the data and the methods used 1. Our contribution focuses on a
potentially important and little inquired channel through which foreign ﬁrms may aﬀect
local economies: the so called Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect.
Since spillovers of foreign ﬁrms on local ones are not directly measurable2,w en e e dt o
identify some characteristics that aﬀect these spillovers from foreign ﬁrms and test their
eﬀect on local productivity. Previous studies have identiﬁed the following ﬁve determi-
nants of spillovers from FDI: (1) the total amount of MNEs present in a country; (2) the
technological proximity of those MNEs to local ﬁrms; (3) the spatial proximity of those
1For surveys see Blomström and Kokko [6] and Görg and Greenaway [24]. An interesting meta-study of
the diﬀerent research results is Görg and Strobl [25] which shows that the results depend on the research
design.
2There are some attempts to come closer to a direct measurement. Branstetter [8] uses patent citation
data, Cassiman and Veugelers [9] rely on survey data, and Soussa [48] measures training of workers in
MNEs and indigenous ﬁrms. Each of these studies address speciﬁc channels of spillovers, but they do not
analyse the overall impact of spillover eﬀects.
2MNEs to local ﬁrms; (4) the size of the technological gap between local ﬁrms and MNEs
(Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect) and (5) the absorptive capacity of indigenous ﬁrms in adopt-
ing MNE technology. While these factors could be working together and reinforcing each
other most of the empirical research has focused primarily on factors (1)-(3) measuring the
eﬀect of foreign owned ﬁrms in some sectors and countries on the productivity of domestic
ﬁrms3. In the present paper, while controlling for the eﬀect of MNE density in geographi-
cal and technological proximity, we concentrate on the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect and on
the absorptive capacity hypothesis. Much less has been said about these two channels.
First formalized by Findlay [16] who dates it back to the contribution of Veblen [51]
and Gerschenkron [20] the hypothesis states that regions or countries with a large initial
technological gap are more likely to beneﬁt from spillovers of FDI. As a consequence they
may experience stronger growth of total factor productivity relative to advanced regions
or countries. To our knowledge only Kokko [42], Sjöholm [47], Girma [27] and Griﬃth et
al. [31] have attempted to take this eﬀect into account. They mainly analyze the sector
dimension of this type of spillovers. Kokko [42] calculates the average (rather than TFP)
productivity gap of foreign and indigenous ﬁrms by industry and divides the sample into
high and low gap observations. Contrary to the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect, spillovers are
stronger in the low-gap sample half. Sjöholm [47] splits the ﬁrm observations in two equally
sized groups: those with industries that have a large gap of total factor productivity and
those that have a small gap and estimates separately their production functions. He ﬁnds
that MNE density has a stronger impact on industries with large technology gaps if one
excludes enclave industries. However, the sample split is chosen arbitrarily and no regional
dimension is taken into account, nor is technology catch-up explicitly modeled.
Griﬃth et al. [30] derive the estimation from a theoretical model and calculate from
factor cost shares total-factor-productivity gaps of ﬁrms to the industry technology fron-
tier on UK manufacturing establishments. While there is catch up to the frontier, this
catch up is not stronger if the frontier ﬁrm is foreign-owned. Girma [27] estimates the
3Surveys are Blomström and Kokko [6] and Greenaway and Goerg [24]. More recent papers are:
Halpern and K˝ orösi [32], Angelucci et al. [2], Dimelis and Louri [14], Djankov and Hoekman [15], Girma
and Wakelin [29], Braconier et al. [7], Kinoshita [40], and Konings [41].
3productivity gap of a ﬁrm to the industry frontier and investigates the absorptive capacity
of an indigenous ﬁrm to beneﬁt from spillovers of the industry frontier ﬁrm by applying
threshold regression techniques.
Contrarily to the previous literature, our focus is on the regional dimension of the
Veblen-Gerschenkron spillover eﬀect as several studies have pointed out the localized na-
ture of knowledge spillovers (see Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg [36] Section II for a survey). We
use two geographically detailed data sets that have not been used before to address this
question. They contain data from a sample of domestic and foreign-owned manufacturing
ﬁrms in Germany for the period 1993-1999 and in Italy for the period 1992-1998. We also
use other regional data on 16 Laender in Germany and 103 Provinces in Italy.
Italy and Germany are two particularly interesting countries for such analysis. First,
they include highly productive and advanced regions (Western Germany and Northern
Italy) as well as relatively backward ones (Eastern Germany and the Mezzogiorno) allowing
a large range of variability in ﬁrm productivity. Second, the less developed regions exhibit
a substantial technology gap between multinational and local ﬁrms (although not so large
as to be prohibitive). Finally the political, institutional and legal variables are common to
all regions within a country and therefore are fully controlled for. While historically very
diﬀerent, the problem of underdevelopment of a part of the country relative to the other is
of the greatest concern for the government of both Italy and Germany. Our contribution
addresses also the potential role of FDI in facilitating the economic catch-up of the lagging
regions reducing the existing economic disparities.
We test the Veblen-Gerschenkron hypothesis using a two-stage estimation procedure.
In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the region (for Italy the sector-region) speciﬁcc o m p o n e n to f
total factor productivity for national and multinational ﬁrms from about 45,000 Italian and
1,000 German ﬁrms. In the second stage, we use these estimates of regional productivity
(or, for Italy, sector-region productivity) to perform a panel analysis for Germany and a
cross section for Italy. Speciﬁcally, we measure FDI intensity in a region and the initial
total factor productivity gap between national and foreign owned ﬁrms and we consider
the eﬀect of these variables on the subsequent growth rate of productivity of indigenous
ﬁrms controlling for other potential determinants of growth.
4Our econometric results detect the presence of a relevant Veblen-Gerschenkron spillover
eﬀect as the initial productivity gap between local MNEs and local domestic ﬁrms seem
positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms.
Such ﬁnding is robust to some alternative hypothesis and standard robustness checks. We
discuss and check several potential explanations for this eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our econometric
model and the estimation strategy used pointing out the diﬀerences in implementing the
method for German and Italian data. Section 3 describes the data, and the productivity
estimates for national and multinational ﬁrms in regions and provinces of the two countries.
Section 4 estimates the eﬀect of multinational density and the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect
on productivity-growth of local ﬁrms. Section 5 concludes.
2E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
2.1 Speciﬁcation
We propose a two stage estimation strategy to investigate the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect
of FDI spillovers. The ﬁrst stage of our model identiﬁes the region-sector-time speciﬁct o t a l
factor productivity level (TFP) and productivity growth for national and multinational
ﬁrms. We estimate the following ﬁrm-level Cobb Douglas production function, allowing
for province-sector-time speciﬁc TFP both for indigenous ﬁrms and MNEs:
ln(Yit)=a0 + a1 ln(Lit)+a2 ln(Kit)+a3 ln(Mit)+
X
s∈S
dsDs + υpst + εit, (1)
where Yit is the value of sales of ﬁrm i at time t, Lit the number of employees, Kit the
real ﬁxed assets and Mit the real cost of materials. Ds are sector dummies for the set of
all sectors S, a1, a2, a3 and ds are regression coeﬃcients4, εit is an i.i.d. zero-mean error
term. We specify region-industry-time ﬁxed eﬀects υpst as follows:
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The productivity gap captures the scope for technological catch-up between foreign ﬁrms
and domestic ones. As Veblen [51] and Gerschenkron [20] argued, the size of the spillovers
depends positively on the relative backwardness of a region: the larger the gap the greater
is the potential for indigenous ﬁrms to learn from the MNEs.
In order to test this hypothesis in the second stage, we estimate a productivity growth




pst = b0 + b1 · A
N
ps,t−1 + b2 · gapps,t−1 + b3 · MNEdensityps,t−1 +
X
p∈P
dpDp + νpst, (5)
where MNEdensityps,t−1 denotes the ratio of MNE employment to employment in indige-
nous ﬁrms in a region p, sector s,a n dt i m et−1, Dp are region-dummies and νpst is a zero
mean i.i.d. error term. The basic structure of this estimation equation is very similar to the
one proposed in Findlay [16]: a large productivity gap between MNEs and domestic ﬁrms,
5S, P and T are the sets of sectors, regions and years in the data sample, respectively.
6As the production function is estimated in logarithms the growth rate is deﬁned as log change of TFP.
6generates scope for learning of indigenous ﬁrms. The existence of a Veblen-Gerschenkron
eﬀect implies that the coeﬃcient b2 is positive. In addition, we control for the commonly
studied measure of spillover eﬀects - density of MNEs (MNEdensity)7 - and for the usual
TFP-convergence term - initial productivity of indigenous ﬁrms (AN
ps,t−1).
Notice that the productivity gap estimated in equation (4) does not capture a generic
sector-region eﬀect. The variable is obtained as diﬀerence between MNE’s and domestic
ﬁrms’ productivity in the same sector, region and period. Any location-speciﬁc unob-
servable characteristic aﬀecting productivity growth of all companies would be diﬀerenced
away.
The convergence coeﬃcient b1 captures the dynamics of productivity around its bal-
anced growth path (BGP) assuming that we have included among the regressors the
determinants of BGP productivity. Sectors hit by some speciﬁc random shocks tend to
move back towards their BGP productivity level as long as the coeﬃcient b1 is negative.
While (1) and (5) denote our ideal speciﬁcation, we have to adjust our empirical model
to match our data sets of Italian and German data. For Italy, the number of sampled ﬁrms
increased over time. To avoid the noise of year-to-year variation, that could be driven by
varying sampling errors, we estimate the productivity growth over the entire period rather



























where t is a time trend and therefore gM
ps and gN
ps are the estimated growth rates of pro-
ductivity of MNE and domestic ﬁrms. These coeﬃcients are directly used in the second
stage regression. No such problem exists for German data as the sample of ﬁr m si ss t a b l e
across years. However, as there is not suﬃcient coverage of sectors across regions, we drop
the sector index in the second stage regression and analyze the average productivity for a
whole region (Land). We still keep sector dummies in the ﬁrst stage estimation.
7See Aitken and Harrison [1] and the survey of Goerg and Greenaway [24] for such kind of studies.
72.2 Estimation Issues
We discuss here some important issues encountered in estimating equation (5). First, the
dynamic speciﬁcation assumes that the initial MNE density and the initial productivity gap
do not depend on subsequent productivity growth of national ﬁrms. This seems reasonable
even if we assume that MNE location decisions are taken with rational expectations. Those
ﬁrms should not be concerned with the future growth of local companies when deciding
where to locate.8
Second, the variables AN
pst and gN
pst are estimated from the same ﬁrst stage regression,
and therefore potentially subject to the same measurement errors. In order to check
for inconsistency of the estimates, we also perform an IV estimation of equation (5).
In particular as an instrument for AN
pst, which was obtained from production function
estimations, we use the values of AN
pst obtained from wage regressions using average ﬁrm
wage costs on the left hand side of (1) instead of sales, and similarly for the initial gappst.
As average wage and sales per worker are both measures of productivity we have an
instrument for TFP which is uncorrelated with the measurement error of sales. This
strategy should grant the consistency of the estimates, in particular of the parameter b2.
Third, it is often argued that the extent of product market competition may be relevant
for the size of spillover eﬀects (see Kokko [42], Haskel et al. [34], Keller and Yeaple
[39] for econometric analysis and Wang and Blomstroem [52] for a theoretical model).
Unfortunately we do not have measures of competition in a market. However as long as
the level of competition varies mostly at the industry level it should be taken care of by
industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover we control for the number of multinationals in the region,
which could be considered itself a proxy for the level of competition.
We are aware that omitted variables, such as workers’ skills or capacity utilization, not
included in estimating the production function in equation (1) would result in an excessive
estimated variance of TFP, as TFP is probably correlated with these unmeasured factors.
8For Italian data we have an endogeneity problem, because we have to use MNE density in the ﬁnal
year rather than the ﬁrst, as we can approve representativeness of this variable only towards the end. (See
the data-appendix.)
8This overestimate of the variance of the gap would generate a downward bias in the
estimate of the coeﬃcient b2 w h i c ht h e r e f o r ec o u l db ec o n s i d e r e da sal o w e rb o u n do ft h e
intensity of the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect.
Moreover, some interpretation issues arise: does our coeﬃcient b2 genuinely capture
spillovers? The productivity of domestic ﬁrms may increase in the presence of highly
productive MNEs simply as an eﬀect of competition. MNEs crowd out weak domestic
competitors forcing them to leave the market and average productivity of surviving in-
digenous ﬁrms rises9. While this is per se an interesting channel we distinguish it from the
Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect by analyzing the correlation of the gap-term with the subse-
quent change in domestic employment. Only if the gap is negatively correlated with em-
ployment growth and negative employment growth aﬀects positively productivity growth
the channel described above can be at work. We will see that this does not seem to be the
case.
Finally, we investigate whether the Veblen-Gerschenkron technology spillover eﬀect
requires a minimum human capital endowment of a region to provide a suﬃcient absorptive
capacity to indigenous ﬁrms. For this purpose, we apply a threshold regression technique10.
3 Productivity and foreign owned ﬁrms
The results of the ﬁrst-stage regressions are qualitatively similar for Italy and Germany
and we present them together in this section after a brief description of the data for each
country.
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics: Italy
The data on Italian ﬁrms contain about 45,000 units in the manufacturing sector in 1998
and about 160,000 single observations over the time period 1992 to 1998. The database
9See analogue arguments in Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Barry et al. (2001).
10This idea has been formalized in Keller [37] and Glass and Saggi [21] and tested in several recent
papers such as Braconier et al. [7], Konnings [41], Kinoshita [40], and Girma [27] using traditional
measures of foreign presence in an industry.
9of Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano is a merger of the AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk
with balance sheet and proﬁt and loss account information and the MNE database of
Politecnico Milano, which contains ownership information. We have an unbalanced panel
in the ﬁrm-time dimension. The observations on ﬁrms’ balance sheets include data on the
number of employees on the wage cost, on the values of sales, on the value of materials
used as intermediates, on ﬁxed assets of the company, its sector, location and name. We
use the complete universe of foreign owned ﬁrms, deﬁned as those ﬁrms with a non-zero
share of voting rights held by foreigners.
In 1998 total employment in foreign ﬁrms was 402,704 employees the bulk of which,
about 150,000, was concentrated in the province of Milano. The detailed description of
the procedure used to clean some outliers and unrealistic breaks in the data is described
in the appendix.11 Table 1 reports the average values for the variables we use for the year
1998, divided into national and foreign owned companies and into North and South.12
Insert Table 1 here
MNEs are on average larger than national ﬁrms, and ﬁrms in the North are on average
larger than those in the South. MNEs pay larger wages and have larger average labor
productivity than domestic ﬁrms. Wages and production per worker are larger in the
North than in the South. Southern ﬁrms seem to be more capital intensive probably
because of the lower worker’s productivity, in spite of lower wages.
Multinational ﬁrms are mostly concentrated in the North of Italy. We report in ﬁgure
1 the density of multinational ﬁrms (MNEdensity) calculated as employment in MNE di-
vided by employment in domestic ﬁrms, relative to the average value for Italy measured in
1998. A value of one for MNEdensity means that the province has the same employment
in multinational relative to national ﬁrms as the Italian average.
11An investigation of the representativeness of our ﬁrm data compared to oﬃcial aggregate data is
provided in the data-appendix.
12Southern regions are Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Calabria, Basilicata, Puglia, Sicilia and Sardegna.
10Insert Figure 1 here
While the highest relative concentration of MNE is in the Center-North, there are large
diﬀerences in MNE density among the Southern provinces. Interestingly the northern
part of the Mezzogiorno (northern Campania and Abruzzo) shows a high concentration of
foreign owned ﬁrms in 1998. Some isolated provinces in the South, also had an unusually
large concentration of multinationals. Certainly, though, all the provinces with lower
concentration of foreign owned ﬁrms, except for very few, were located in the South. In
particular all the provinces without any foreign owned ﬁrm (Agrigento, Caltanissetta,
Campobasso, Enna, Foggia, Lecce, Nuoro, Ragusa, Sassari) are in the south and four of
them are in Sicily.
3.2 Data and Summary Statistics: Germany
The ﬁrm data for Germany are obtained from the database Amadeus 200,000 of Bureau
van Dijk.13 We use only manufacturing ﬁrms. The dataset covers about 2% of German
manufacturing ﬁrms and about 28% of German manufacturing employment. We have
an unbalanced panel of a bit less than 1000 manufacturing ﬁrms per year over the time
period 1993-1999.14 We use data on employment, wage cost, sales, ﬁxed assets (machinery,
real estate, equipment, etc.15), and material costs. Additionally, the dataset contains
information on the location, sector and ownership of the ﬁrms. We use a fairly broad
regional aggregation, i.e. the 16 Laender 16 to have a suﬃcient regional coverage of all
types of ﬁrms. Unfortunately, there are no foreign owned ﬁrms in Sachsen (Saxony) in the
13Funke and Rahn [19] used these data to estimate ﬁrm TFP, but did not distinguish MNEs from
domestic ﬁrms.
14The year 1999 is strongly underrepresented. Otherwise, the number of ﬁr m si sf a i r l ys t a b l eo v e rt i m e .
See the data-appendix.
15We tried to ﬁnd a good measure of the physical capital stock. Tangible ﬁxed assets would have come
closer to total ﬁxed assets, but we would have faced the cost of too many missing values.
16The Laender correspond to the NUTS1 classiﬁcation of EUROSTAT.
11dataset.17
Consistently with the deﬁnition used for Italy, we deﬁne as MNEs in Germany all
ﬁrms with reported non zero foreign participation. Relevant for ownership is the reported
ultimate owner. Only if no information is available on the ultimate owner, the direct
ownership determines the nationality of a ﬁrm. In general, we deﬁne also Western-owned
ﬁrms in East Germany as multinational ﬁrms, since we are interested in spillovers and those
may come as much from MNEs in West-Germany as from MNEs from other countries18.
Companies of Treuhandanstalt, the privatization agency of the German government, are
considered local ﬁrms. We have only ownership information for the most recent year of
a ﬁrm record. Hence, we may mis-classify those ﬁrms which became multinationals by
merging foreign ﬁrms during the considered period. The problem is alleviated though,
because Bureau van Dijk tends to classify merged ﬁr m sa sn e wﬁrms in the dataset.
However, there are exceptions and we are unable to control for them. We will also use
unpublished aggregate MNE activity data by Lander and year of Deutsche Bundesbank.
Those data deﬁne MNEs as ﬁrms with foreign voting rights of at least 20% during the
sample period.19 Those data include all sectors.
The averages of the variables in table 2 reveal that there are diﬀerences both across
ﬁrm types (foreign owned, local owned) and across regions (East, West)20. In general,
MNEs in the West are most capital intensive, more material intensive and face higher
wage costs per employee on average. National ﬁrms in the East are less capital intensive
and have lower wage costs per employee. Multinationals in East Germany use the least
material inputs. This may indicate a lack of specialized input producers in East Germany.
The Eastern ﬁrms in the sample are on average smaller than Western ﬁrms, and MNEs in
the East are larger than national ﬁrms in the East.
17In fact, unpublished Bundesbank data show that there are hardly any foreign owned ﬁrms in Sachsen
(Saxony). The ratio of employment in foreign owned ﬁrms to domestic owned ﬁrms is 0.009 in 1993 and
even less in 1998.
18Criscuolo and Martin [10] show that UK-owned MNEs in the UK have the same productivity advantage
over UK ﬁrms with no plants abroad than have foreign-owned MNEs in the UK.
19More information on these data may be found in Deutsche Bundesbank [12].
20Berlin is counted as a “Western” Land despite its geographical location in the East.
12Insert Table 2 here
This dataset over-represents large ﬁrms since only ﬁr m st h a th a v em o r et h a n2 0 0e m -
ployees or more than 10 Mill. DM Assets or more than 10 Mill. DM Sales are included.
Moreover, many observations are missing. Therefore, we investigate representativeness
of the database thoroughly in the data-appendix by using aggregate data of Statistisches
Bundesamt and Deutsche Bundesbank for comparison, and ﬁnd that Eastern Germany as
well as some industry sectors such as printing, textile, mill products manufacturing are
under-represented, while car, primary metals, and stone, clay, glass and concrete products
are overrepresented relative to the average21. The location information refers to the head-
quarter of corporations. The problem of misallocation of plants, though, is reduced by
using unconsolidated accounts. Those come closer to a match of plant and ﬁrm location.
Insert Figure 2 here
The regional distribution of FDI in Germany for the year 1998 from Bundesbank data is
shown in Figure 2. The reported index is the same as calculated for Italy - MNEdensity.
We notice the highest concentration of MNEs around the German business centres Ham-
burg, Berlin and Frankfurt, and the smallest in Sachsen and Thueringen. While there is
an overall decline of foreign ownership by 1 % point per year during the period from 1993
until 1998, there is a marked diﬀerence in development across regions particularly in the
East. While Brandenburg, Sachsen Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern increased the
presence of MNEs at a moderate speed, Sachsen and Thueringen stayed at a very low level
and even decreased the presence of MNEs. There was also reshuﬄing of ownership in the
West. For example, Bremen increased signiﬁcantly MNE employment density from a low
initial level.
21We correct for the regional bias by using WLS estimation. The construction of weights using un-
published data from Bundesbank and published data from Statistisches Bundesamt is explained in the
appendix.
133.3 First stage Estimation
In order to establish that multinationals have the potential to generate spillovers which
could aﬀect positively the productivity of national ﬁrms, we show ﬁr s tt h a tt h e ya r eo n
average signiﬁcantly more productive than national ﬁrms. Table 3 reports the estimates
of the production function of ﬁrms, separately for Italy and Germany using a regression
similar to the “ﬁrst-stage” regression (1), but with the ﬁxed eﬀect term υpst drastically
simpliﬁed. We only estimate the production function adding a dummy for foreign owned
ﬁrms (speciﬁcation I and III) or three dummies for the combination of foreign and national
ﬁrms in the rich and poor part of the country (speciﬁcation II and IV). The estimated
coeﬃcients on these dummies provide a measure of the productivity advantage of foreign
ﬁrms on national ﬁrms, and on how it varies in the rich or in the poor part of the country.
Insert Table 3 here
Some patterns emerge clearly in the two countries, in spite of several diﬀerences. The
ﬁr s ti st h a tt h eM N E sa r eo na v e r a g es i g n i ﬁcantly more productive than national ﬁrms,
although the diﬀerence in productivity is much larger for Germany (12%) than for Italy
(2%). Germany may attract more productive MNEs, or foreign-owned ﬁrms in Germany
may be relatively skill intensive, whereas foreign-owned ﬁrms in Italy may be relatively
low-skilled.
Interestingly, the productivity gap between foreign and domestically owned ﬁrms is
rather homogeneous on the national territory of each country: in Italy MNEs are about
2% more productive than national ﬁr m sb o t hi nt h eN o r t ha n di nt h eS o u t h ;i nG e r m a n y
MNE are 12% more productive than nationals both in the West and in the East. MNEs
have lower productivity in the South of Italy and East of Germany than in the North
and West respectively. Since foreign owned aﬃliates can be assumed to have access to
the technology of the parent company, lower productivity cannot be due only to poorer
technology of indigenous ﬁrms. If so, regional spillover eﬀe c t sf r o mM N E sw i l ln o ts o l v e
the underdevelopment problem entirely. Still, they may alleviate it.
14Finally, foreign ﬁrms in the “poor” part of the country are about as productive as
domestic ﬁrms in the “rich” part of the country. This can be seen from speciﬁcation II and
IV in which we omitted the dummy “Indigenous ﬁr m si nR i c hR e g i o n ”a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient
on the dummy “MNE in the Poor Region” is basically zero. Notice that MNEs in the rich
region are signiﬁcantly more productive than that (respectively +2% in Italy and +12%
in Germany) while domestic ﬁrms in the poor part of the country are signiﬁcantly less
productive than that (-2% in Italy and -13% in Germany).
We run a similar regression (results not reported) using the log of per capita wage
as dependent variable.22 We obtain qualitatively similar results, in that wages paid by
domestic ﬁrms in the rich part of the country, once we control for inputs and capital,
are similar to wages paid by foreign ﬁrms in the poor part of the country. Also for wage
data it is true that the diﬀerences between Northern and Southern Italy are smaller than
diﬀerences between East and West Germany and so is the foreign-national productivity
gap.
Finally, we replicate previous studies by using MNE employment shares by industry,
province and year in the case of Italy and province and year from Germany23 to measure
their eﬀect on productivity of indigenous ﬁrms estimating a speciﬁcation as (1). The
results are shown in Table 4. Both for Italy and for Germany, a signiﬁcant positive sign
on the coeﬃcient of the MNE employment share vanishes, as soon as ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
a r ei n c l u d e di nt h es p e c i ﬁcation. Alternatively, running the same regression with all
variables in time diﬀerences as in Haskel et al. [34] also renders the MNE employment
share coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant (not reported). Therefore, we do not ﬁnd spillover eﬀects for
Italy using MNE employment share as proxy of the source of these spillovers.
22It is straight forward to derive that ﬁxed eﬀects of wage regressions represent TFP under some
assumptions. Alternatively, one may want to refer to Fosfuri et al. [18] for another theoretical justiﬁcation
using diﬀerent assumptions.
23In the case of Italy, the MNE employment share is constructed from the ﬁrm database; in the case
of Germany, it is calculated from unpublished data of Deutsche Bundesbank and of data of Statistisches
Bundesamt. Moreover, we did not apply WLS estimation on German data to keep our results as close as
possible to the previous literature.
15Insert Table 4 here
3.4 Initial productivity gap and productivity growth
3.4.1 Italy
The main result from the ﬁrst stage estimation is that we obtain a measure of the initial
productivity gap between national and multinational ﬁrms in each province-sector, gapps =
AM
ps− AN
ps, and a measure of the growth of productivity of national ﬁrms for the province-
sectors gN
ps. As these are two key variables it is useful to show their estimated values and
represent them on a map of Italian provinces. While in our empirical strategy we use
the province-sector as unit of spillover diﬀusion, in our map we simply represent the two
variables averaged by province across sectors. In ﬁg u r e3a n d4w er e p o r tt h ev a l u e so f
gapps a n do fg r o w t hr a t egN
ps respectively. The gap between estimated TFP of National
and Multinational ﬁrms shows which provinces have more to gain from the presence of
multinationals, simply through catch-up of local ﬁrms on foreign ﬁrms.
Insert Figure 3 here
W h i l ei np r o v i n c e sw i t h o u ta n yM N Ew ec a n n o tc a l c u l a t et h i sv a l u ea n dw eh a v ea
missing observation (dotted regions) it is apparent that the “upper” part of the mez-
zogiorno (excluding the southernmost regions and the islands) has potential for intense
catch-up. On average the center-south seems to be the area that can potentially gain
most from the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect. While, clearly, several other factors aﬀect the
productivity growth of national ﬁrms, the estimated gN
ps by province, reported in Figure
4c o n ﬁrm that the central-southern regions have done better compared to the South and
the North.
Insert Figure 4 here
16While only a rigorous analysis could prove the existence of correlation between initial
gap and productivity growth, the presented stylized evidence is suggestive and pushes us
t oi n q u i r ei n t ot h i se ﬀect with greater care.
3.4.2 Germany
The estimates of the variables gappt and gN
pt for Germany are performed for each year
(1993-98). We report in Figure 5 and 6 the value of the gap-variable at the beginning
of the considered period (1993) and for the growth variable its average over the whole
period 1993-1998, respectively. No clear East-West pattern emerges for the gap-variable.
Thueringen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Berlin have the largest gap that could potentially foster
their productivity growth. Unfortunately, we don’t have any observation for Sachsen and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
Insert Figure 5 here
In contrast, the pattern of productivity growth for the 1993-98 period has a much
clearer East-West divide. As ﬁgure 6 shows, the period considered is characterized by
a generalized productivity-catch-up of the Eastern regions to the Western regions. This
could be due to the initially lower productivity of Eastern regions, to their technological
catch-up or to out-migration from the East that freed ﬁxed local factors.24
Insert Figure 6 here
Interestingly, though, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Land, in which local ﬁrms were
among those with the lowest productivity and very little presence of MNEs, is the region
that grew least in the East, while Rheinland-Pfalz, the region with larger productivity
gap between national and foreign ﬁrms is the Land that grew most in the West. While
24For a regional growth analysis of Germany after the uniﬁcation see Keller [38]. He obtains similar
catch-up in TFP of Eastern Laender from aggregate data over the period from 1991 until 1996. Our
results suggest, however, that this catch-up did not continue from approximately 1998.
17suggestive, these are merely stylized facts. We now move to the formal econometric analysis
performing the second stage regressions.
4 Testing the Veblen-Gerschenkron Eﬀect
Using the ﬁrst stage estimates of initial productivity and productivity gap we test the
hypothesis that the productivity gap between national companies and MNEs in the same
region (and sector) may stimulate the productivity growth of local ﬁrms. We also control
for the simple density of multinationals in geographical and technological proximity of
national companies. We estimate equation (5) for Italy and Germany focussing on the size
and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients b2 and b3.T h eﬁrst is the elasticity of national companies’
productivity growth to the initial domestic—MNE productivity gap, the second is the
elasticity of national companies’ productivity growth to the MNE density in the region
(and sector in the Italian case). Again we present the results for Italy ﬁrst and for Germany
last, commenting on their similarities and diﬀerences.
4.1 Italy’s Cross Section
Table 5 summarizes the main results in the Italian case. We regress the average yearly
productivity growth for each province-sector, estimated from the previous section on the
gap variable measured in 1998, Gap.25 Using OLS estimates the gap variable is signiﬁcant
and positive when introduced by itself (speciﬁcation I), and also when we control for the
MNE density in the province and sector (speciﬁcation II). The coeﬃcients are elasticities
and imply that increasing the gap between national and multinational productivity by
100% would result in increased yearly growth rates of domestic productivity of about
1.5%. Interestingly, the MNE density variable is not signiﬁcant and has even the wrong
sign. Speciﬁcations III and IV are the same as I and II but they use instrumental variable
estimation. While standard errors increase and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients decreases, the
25Ideally, we would like to have the initial productivity gap in 1993. Since selection bias is likely to be
very large the ﬁrst years of our sample and smaller towards the end, we choose to use the gap in 1998 as
proxy variable assuming it to be highly correlated with the true initial gap.
18gap variable remains signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Moreover, the size of the gap-coeﬃcient
does not change. These results suggest that the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect is the most
relevant and robust channel through which MNEs presence aﬀects the growth of local
ﬁrms.
Insert Table 5 here
It is important to notice that the omission of some important variables, aﬀecting both
the quality of incoming MNEs and the growth rates of indigenous ﬁrms, may bias the
OLS estimates. For instance some provinces are more attractive to highly productive
MNEs because the local crime rate is low, the local government is more eﬃcient and the
local population is highly educated. The same characteristics could be responsible for
sustained productivity growth and omitting them would bias up the coeﬃcient on the
Gap variable. As we can measure some of these socio-economic variables that potentially
aﬀect growth we run the regression including these controls and we report the results in
Table 6. Following recent work (see Forni and Paba [17], Peri and Cunat [44]) we consider
as potentially relevant for the regional growth of Italian provinces the degree of education
of its labor force (measured as the share of illiterate people in the population in year 1991,
illiterate 1991), the presence of organized crime measured by the density of homicides
per thousand persons in 1985, murder 1985, and the participation to the local political
community, measured by the turnout at a local referendum vote in 1974, referendum
1974. The last variable is considered in several studies (such as Putnam et al. [45]) as
a good proxy for the “social capital” in Italian regions. While certainly other variables
may have an important role in determining growth we believe that the inclusion of these
provides a check of the robustness of the coeﬃcient of the gap variable. Speciﬁcation I in
Table 6 shows the results obtained by including the controls.
Insert Table 6 here
Comparing the coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation I with those in speciﬁcation I of Table 5,
we notice that the size and signiﬁcance of the gap variable has slightly decreased, while
19the eﬀect of MNE density is still not signiﬁcant. Our controls do not seem to have much
predictive power. Only the social capital variable is weakly signiﬁcant with a negative
coeﬃcient. As these are province-wide control variables and we know that diﬀerent in-
dustries may have quite diﬀerent growth rates within a province, their low signiﬁcance
is not a surprise. In order to fully account for unobserved regional characteristics, we
include regional ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcation II. The gap variable remains signiﬁcant and
its coeﬃcient is 0.014. These checks do not support the idea of downward bias on the
gap coeﬃcient due to omitted variables. Overall, the evidence suggests that the simple
presence of MNEs does not foster productivity growth of local ﬁrms, unless there is a
productivity gap for the local ﬁrm to catch up to.
In speciﬁcation III and IV, we investigate whether a large productivity gap drives weak
indigenous ﬁrms out of business and rises through this channel, rather than by promoting
catch-up, the average productivity of the surviving ﬁrms. Speciﬁcation III includes the
growth rate of the number of plants in a province from 1991 to 1996, and instruments it
with the productivity gap variable.26 Neither the growth in number of plants (speciﬁcation
III) nor the growth in employment (speciﬁcation IV) have any signiﬁcant correlation with
local productivity growth. Moreover, in the (unreported) ﬁrst stage regression the initial
productivity gap variable is not a signiﬁcant predictor of employment growth and has the
wrong sign, i.e. there is a positive relation between plant growth and productivity gap.
Finally, we do not have the universe of all Italian ﬁrms in our dataset (see data ap-
pendix). In fact, we have no productivity data either of indigenous or foreign-owned ﬁrms
in about three quarters of all possible combinations of industry and province.27 One may
argue that there are no domestic ﬁrms active in an industry, when the potential produc-
tivity gap is too large. Likewise, there may not be MNEs active if the productivity gap
to indigenous ﬁr m si st o os m a l l ,s i n c eM N E sh a v et oc o m p e n s a t el o c a la d j u s t m e n tc o s t
26We employ data from the Italian censuses of production in 1991 and 1996. We have unit of plants
data by province and 2-digit industry. Unfortunately, the industry classiﬁcation is not directly compatible
with the one of our ﬁrm database. Hence, we aggregate data for manufacturing as a whole.
27Typically, there lack many industries in most provinces. In particular, MNEs do not cover all indus-
tries.
20disadvantages with a technology advantage. Hence, there may be a selection bias problem.
In order to investigate selection bias, we run an (unreported) Heckman regression with
employment, number of plant growth, number of plants in 1991, and number of employ-
ees in 1991 in the selection equations28.T h e s e ﬁrst stage variables seem appropriate to
capture the probability of missing indigenous or foreign owned ﬁrms in an industry and
province. The selection equation is weakly signiﬁcant and the productivity gap variable
remains signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
4.2 Germany’s panel
The German case provides a second test for the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect. On one hand,
as we are considering larger geographical units and we are merging sectors together, this
test might capture cross-sector and less localized spillovers. On the other hand, as we are
using the year to year variation of productivity gap and productivity growth this test is
more demanding, in that it requires the catch-up eﬀect to work in the short-run. In this
sense, the two studies reinforce each other. The second stage estimates for Germany are
based on speciﬁcation (5) and require the estimate of a panel.
Insert table 7 here
Speciﬁc a t i o nIa n dI Io fT a b l e7a r ee s t i m a t e du s i n g O L Sw i t hr o b u s ts t a n d a r de r r o r s .
They conﬁrm the ﬁnding that there is conditional convergence in the productivity levels
of domestic ﬁr m sa n dt h a tt h eg a pv a r i a b l eh a sap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on the
domestic-ﬁrm productivity growth during the following year. Again, the simple measure
of MNE density in the region29 does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect. Speciﬁcation III and
IV apply instrumental variable techniques, where instruments are obtained in the same
28These are the only variables for which we have suﬃciently detailed information on 103 provinces and
23 sectors obtained from the Italian censuses of production in 1991 and 1996. Unfortunately, we have
some mismatch of industry classiﬁcations (see data-appendix).
29This variable is constructed from unpublished data of Deutsche Bundesbank on employment in foreign-
owned ﬁr m si na l ls e c t o r sa n de m p l o y m e n ti na l lﬁrms from Statistisches Bundesamt.
21way as for the Italian case, by using a wage regression. The productivity gap variable
remains signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. However, the coeﬃcient becomes larger.
We also perform some robustness checks for the German case. Also in this case some
initial controls at the regional level are used to capture local factors that may aﬀect
productivity growth. Given some limitation on the availability of regional data, we control
for the log share of university graduates in the population lagged one year30 and for the
investment in physical capital per inhabitant.31
Insert table 8 here
Table 8, speciﬁcation I, presents the baseline panel regression including the control
variables. The coeﬃcient of the productivity gap variable remains positive and signiﬁcant.
The MNE density maintains its low and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, while the initial level of
human capital has a positive and weakly signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity growth. This
is consistent with the idea that human capital fosters productivity growth, possibly by
providing skilled labor to innovative companies.
In speciﬁcation II, we investigate the alternative hypothesis that average productivity
growth rises, because competition from MNEs with large productivity advantages force
domestic ﬁrms to cut their labor force, which increases their average productivity. While,
indeed, there is a negative relation between domestic-ﬁrm productivity growth and em-
ployment growth in manufacturing in a Land, when instrumented by the productivity
gap32,t h i se ﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
In speciﬁcation III we replace the MNE density measure based on employment with
the log of FDI stock in a Land as share of the physical capital stock.33 Not surprisingly,
30This variable stems from Statistisches Bundesamt.
31The capital stock of a Land in the year 1991 is obtained from Keller [38] and updated using investment
data from Statistisches Bundesamt.
32In the ﬁrst stage regression we obtain a negative coeﬃcient of the productivity gap variable on
employment growth, signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level.
33Contrary to FDI employment data, the unpublished FDI stock data of Deutsche Bundesbank are
collected by law enforcement. The correlation between FDI stock data and FDI employment data by
Land and year (128 observations) is 0.96.
22also this alternative measure of MNE presence is not signiﬁcant, while the productivity
gap variable remains signiﬁcant.
Finally, we note that in the context of dynamic panel estimators with small time
dimension, there is an estimation bias that can be corrected by an Arellano and Bond [3]
dynamic panel estimator. Although we have too few observations to conﬁdently apply this
technique, we still ﬁnd that the productivity gap variable remains signiﬁcant at the 1 %
level.34
4.3 Spillovers’ Absorptive Capacity
Finally, we investigate the so called “absorptive capacity” hypothesis.35 In investigating
this question we follow Braconier et al. [7], Konings [41], Kinoshita [40], and Girma [27].
We adopt the estimation technique of Girma [27] using threshold regressions (Hansen [33]).
In particular, we assume that technological growth of indigenous ﬁrms depends on the
total factor productivity gap between MNEs and indigenous ﬁrms only if a region has a
suﬃcient amount of human capital endowment. This captures the idea that catching up
requires some skills and is not simply an eﬀect of being less developed. We deviate in this
choice of the threshold variable from Girma [27] who separates the sample according to
t h es i z eo ft h et e c h n o l o g yg a po faﬁrm to its most successful competitor within the same
5-digit industry (which is often an MNE)36. We assume, in fact, that absorptive capacity
is a regional characteristic rather than a ﬁrm characteristic.
We ﬁrst search for an optimal threshold value of the regional human capital endowment
in order to split the sample between regions with low and region with high human capital.
Then we test for the signiﬁcance of the sample split using a heteroscedasticity consistent
Supremum-Wald-test.
34There is ﬁrst-order, but not second-order autocorrelation. The Sargan-test for overidentifying restric-
tions is not signiﬁcant. The last test has to be treated with caution in the presence of heteroscedasticity
(see Arellano and Bond [3]).
35In econometric terms, we investigate a structural break in our results.
36However, we follow in spirit the model of Keller [37], who showed that a lack of human capital
(accumulation) may constrain international technology spillover eﬀects.
23An optimal threshold is found by following three steps as in Hansen [33]. First, a
threshold variable is chosen and the data-set is sorted according to it. Then, the data-set
is split into two parts for which the threshold variable is larger/smaller than a threshold
value and the sample halves are estimated separately. This is repeated for each possible
value of the threshold variable and the optimal threshold value is found by maximizing
the joint R2 or a modiﬁed Wald test-statistic in the case of heteroscedasticity across
both sample halves over all possible threshold values of the threshold variable. Finally, a
bootstrap procedure is applied to ﬁnd the probability distribution of the test statistic37.
The threshold regression technique is a generalization of a standard Chow-test for the case,
when the split of the sample is not known a priori and has to be estimated endogenously.
We apply threshold regressions to the two baseline speciﬁcations for Germany and Italy
from table 4 and 6, respectively. As threshold variable we choose HUMCAP, a measure
of human capital in the region (namely the share of population with university degree
lagged one year for Germany and in the year 1991 for Italy).
When applying threshold regressions, we use a Supremum-Wald test which is het-
eroscedasticity consistent. Diebold and Chen [13] have shown that the bootstrap is also
reliable in smaller samples and in the presence of autocorrelation. In a slight variation to
Hansen [33], we allow only the regression constant and the productivity gap coeﬃcient to
vary across regions with high or low human capital endowment. This way, we ensure that
the sample split is signiﬁcant due to the diﬀerential impact of MNE productivity gaps on
regions with large or low absorptive capacity rather than due to some other factors.
The results are shown in Table 9. Neither in the case of Italy nor in the case of Germany
is a sample split signiﬁcant. Hence, we do not ﬁnd evidence that the absorptive capacity
of a region depends crucially on its human capital level. Moreover, we ﬁnd rather opposite
eﬀects for Germany and Italy. In the case of Germany, the regions with a low human capital
endowment38 show a slightly larger potential for spillover eﬀects contrary to the absorptive
capacity hypothesis. In contrast, the potential for MNE externalities on domestic ﬁrms is
smaller in Italian provinces with low human capital endowment in line with the hypothesis
37The estimation and software is described in more detail in Straubhaar, Suhrcke and Urban [49].
38These are observations of some but not only East German Lander.
24of absorptive capacity. We can conclude that probably all regions in both countries have
the minimum human capital endowment to beneﬁt from technological imitation of MNE’s.
Nevertheless, the estimates of Italian data are fairly close to a signiﬁcant threshold and
the absorptive capacity of Southern regions (coeﬃcient on the gap variable) is rather low
at 0.01.
Insert table 9 here
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have explored in this paper the relationship between foreign owned manufacturing
companies ( FDI), and locally owned manufacturing companies focussing on the existence
and determinants of spillovers from the ﬁr s tt ot h es e c o n di nG e r m a n ya n dI t a l y .W eu s e d
an e wﬁrm level dataset of manufacturing ﬁrms in Germany from 1993 to 1999 and in
Italy from 1992 to 1998 and standard sources of regional aggregate data.
We ﬁnd that the larger the gap of total factor productivity of multinational ﬁrms rela-
tive to comparable local ﬁrms the faster is the productivity catch-up of Italian and German
local ﬁrms. This is what we call the Veblen Geschenkron eﬀect. We ﬁnd that this eﬀect is
the main channel through which local companies beneﬁt from the presence of foreign com-
panies. It is not their density to help the local economy but their technological advantage.
Possibly, this is an eﬀect of the “local public good” nature of technological knowledge:
a few MNEs in the neighborhood may already be suﬃcient a source of demonstration to
many indigenous ﬁr m sa sl o n ga st h e yh a v eal a r g et e c h n o l o g i c a la d v a n t a g eo nt h e m .
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30A Data Description: Germany
Firm level data are taken from the database Amadeus 200,000 of Bureau van Dijk. This
database is updated in real time on-line. We took data in March 2001. Bureau van
Dijk eliminates all observations which are older than 5 years. We completed the dataset
by using an old CD-ROM from 1999.39 The ﬁrm matching between the two dataﬁles is
incomplete, because the ﬁrm identiﬁcation code changed slightly in some cases. We have
made a case by case evaluation if in doubt. We have also run consistency checks on location
information and adjusted 43 observations. We have eliminated all missing observations on
the key variables. All ﬁrms without ownership information in the dataset are considered
local owners. This is common practise for the database.
T h ef e wa v a i l a b l eo b s e r v a t i o n sf o rt h ey e a r2 0 0 0w e r ee x c l u d e d . M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v e
excluded observations according to several criteria: 1) All observations with growth rates
of wage cost per employee of more than 100 percent or less than minus 50 %; 2) all
observations for which capital stocks or sales data were reported as 0; 3) all observations
with average wage costs per employee of less than 30,000 DM and more than 1,000,000
DM. Some average wage cost data may be ﬂawed since there may be a mismatch of the
date of reporting of employees and the period over which wage costs are summed up. Also,
restructuring of ﬁrms during the reporting period may be a cause for outliers. Finally,
part-time work is not appropriately counted. Our regression results are not sensitive to
changes in the exclusion criteria, only summary statistic are somewhat sensitive to these
inclusion. Reported industry codes are US-SIC codes. We include only manufacturing
ﬁrms with US-SIC codes 20-39. All observations without US-SIC code are eliminated.
Since there is an exclusion criteria for ﬁrms in Amadeus 200,000 (see main text), we
investigate representativeness in the following. The number of ﬁrms across years is given
in table A1.
39We thank Bocconi library for providing us with these data and Bureau van Dijk, oﬃce Milan, for
giving us special permission for the use of these data.
31Table A1 : Number of German Firms by Year
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of ﬁrms 912 979 1038 934 966 897 409
Hence, there is no important break in the number of observations over time except for the
year 1999.
Table A2: Representativeness by Industry



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ernährungsgewerbe 20 552906 74000 131223 3.6 17001 4.4
Tabakverarbeitung 21 12627 8000 2902 1.6 3910 2.0
Textilgewerbe 22 129038 11000 7789 15.2 1704 6.5
Bekleidungsgewerbe 23 78570 8000 3409 20.7 1221 6.6
Holzgewerbe (ohne
Herstellung von Möbeln)
24 117678 8000 8886 12.3 0




bespielten Ton-, Bild- und
Datenträgern
27 260021 9000 27574 9.1 147 61.2




von Spalt- und Brutstoffen
29 21757 9000 17108 0.7 2963 3.0
Herstellung von Gummi- und
Kunststoffwaren
30 358282 68000 28079 10.3 15561 4.4
Ledergewerbe 31 27881 2000 1762 14.7 0
Glasgewerbe, Keramik,
Verarbeitung von Steinen und
Erden
32 256072 30000 19683 11.5 24356 1.2
Metallerzeugung- und
bearbeitung
33 273094 48000 73509 3.1 42509 1.1
Herstellung von
Metallerzeugnissen
34 599899 67000 37122 14.4 8644 7.8





Herstellung von Geräten der
Elektrizitätserzeugung, -
verteilung u. ä. Und
Rundfunk-, Fernseh- und
Nachrichtentechnik




37 899512 163000 348938 2.1 104240 1.6
Medizin-, Meß-, Steuer- und
Regelungstechnik, Optik
38 225014 56000 25425 6.6 6106 9.2
32Next, we report representativeness of the ﬁrm data in table A2 by using aggregate
data on German manufacturing ﬁrms for Germany for 1998 of Statistisches Bundesamt
[50]. Unfortunately, the German industry code does not match exactly the US-SIC code
of Amadeus. In general, there are 3 sectors more in the German classiﬁcation. We report
therefore the German industry classiﬁcation by its German name and its match of the
US-SIC code.
I ti so b v i o u st h a ts o m es e c t o r sa r eo v e r r e p r e sented and others are under-represented.
For example car industries is overrepresented. This may be so, because ﬁrm size of car
manufacturers is rather large and those ﬁrms are not due to the size exclusion of Amadeus.
Next, we explore regional representativeness of our dataset. The data are shown in
table A3. Wages do not vary much by region. However, the wage data from the Amadeus
dataset are roughly one and a half time larger than those from Statistisches Bundesamt.
This may be due to Statistisches Bundesamt reporting average wage costs for all sectors,
while our Amadeus data only include manufacturing. It is well known that manufacturing
wages are on average higher than wages in other sectors.
It is obvious that Eastern regions are under-represented. Note also that FDI of Saarland
is larger in Amadeus than in the Bundesbank ﬁgures. This is well possible if some MNEs
in Saarland do not report their employment ﬁgures to Bundesbank since this reporting is
voluntary. In fact, the bulk of employment in FDI in Saarland stems from only one single
French ﬁrm.
To cure for the problem of representativeness, we employ WLS estimation. We weight
each observation according to the following procedure. Call X the ratio of employment in
the database and in the oﬃcial statistics of the year 1998 by region, Y the same variable
by ﬁrm type (MNE/ not MNE), and E[.] the unconditional and E[.|.] the conditional
expected value. Then, we construct the weight W according to Bayes-rule as follows by
assuming independence of Y and X:
W = E[Y |X] ∗ E[X].
We chose not to correct for industry bias, since this produced too large a range of weights.
In fact, we would have brought in additional noise by the estimation error of the weights.
33Our regression results, though, are not aﬀected by the use of weights. Note, however, that
we assumed that the regional/ industry structure of the population remains stable over
time, since we have employed only aggregate data for the year 1998.



































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baden-
Württemberg
277 49155 0.18 1244972 334715 0.31 68430 102.833 1.502
Bayern 247 27216 0.11 1189416 248023 0.23 65940 103.162 1.564
Berlin 49 7667 0.16 120949 31667 0.33 71278 88.9932 1.248
Brandenburg 16 2809 0.18 94292 3256 0.06 50004 75.4185 1.508
Bremen 28 5648 0.20 67440 8994 0.22 70772 96.7420 1.366
Hamburg 95 19064 0.20 104057 34078 0.51 80259 113.774 1.417
Hessen 311 104779 0.34 472420 105339 0.44 68875 125.275 1.818
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
9 1274 0.14 45981 2624 0.08 42795 68.8323 1.608
Nieder-
sachsen
90 24974 0.28 566917 51486 0.13 63672 104.507 1.641
Nordrhein-
Westfalen
397 108583 0.27 1528864 294206 0.26 65644 113.775 1.733
Rheinland-
Pfalz
44 6426 0.15 314687 99484 0.34 65252 96.9005 1.485
Saarland 12 13580 1.13 107942 1196 0.14 62134 107.790 1.734
Sachsen 16 0 0.00 214995 21429 0.10 44025 76.8086 1.744
Sachsen-
Anhalt
15 2001 0.13 104783 1430 0.03 44004 71.5093 1.625
Schleswig-
Holstein
48 2938 0.06 143580 8305 0.08 62343 90.7087 1.455
Thüringen 13 2029 0.16 120002 3072 0.04 41255 79.9688 1.938
Deutschland 1667 378143 0.23 6441297 1249304 0.25 106.140
B Data Description: Italy
Firm data are from the database AIDA of Bureau van Dijk and are matched with ownership
information from the MNE database of Politecnico Milano. Only manufacturing ﬁrms are
34included with information on a two-digit industry code (ATECO), the province name
of the ﬁrm headquarter, and a dummy for foreign ownership participation. Whenever
available, unconsolidated balance sheet data are used to avoid as much as possible multi-
plant ﬁrms, which may have production plants in regions other than the one where the
headquarter is located. In general, all Italian manufacturing ﬁrms are included without
size restriction. However, very small enterprises appear under-represented. Moreover the
database is growing over time. While in the initial years only large ﬁrms are sampled,
it remains unclear according to which sampling strategy the database is enlarged until it
reaches full size (See table A4).
Table A4 : Number of Italian Firms by Year
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Number of ﬁrms 3712 4149 12257 20839 37500 42179 46588
When checking representativeness, we use ISTAT data on the Italian census of pro-
duction in 1996 and 1991. Unfortunately, the industry codes of the census and of our
ﬁrm database are largely incompatible. Hence, we can compare only the regional repre-
sentativeness of our dataset. In 1996, there were a total of 5,514,650 employees in Italian
m a n u f a c t u r i n ga c c o r d i n gt oI S T A T .O u rﬁrm database employment coverage is 56 % in
this year. However, the correlation of manufacturing employment over 103 provinces from
our ﬁrm database and from ISTAT is fairly high: 0.93. Therefore, we regard the Italian
ﬁrm data as representative, at least from 1996 onwards.
For Italian ﬁrm data, we exclude all observations for which total assets per employee
are smaller than 3 Million Lira or more than 2,364 Million Lira (which excludes the top
and bottom 500 observations plus all observations with zero value), less than 50 Million
Lira or more than 20000 Million sales per employee, less than 30 Million Lira or more than
1000 Million Lira average wage costs per employee, and less than 10 Million Lira or more
than 20,000 Million Lira material costs per employee. As for German data, results are not
very sensitive to these exclusion criteria (except summary statistics).
35CT a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Italy.
MNEs Indigenous
Firms
Variables: North: South: North: South:
Output per Employee 535 543 527 559
Fixed Assets per Employee 148 79 208 157
Material Imputs per Employee 406 488 562 387
Employees 357 58 257 46
Average Wage Cost/ Employee 73 58 64 54
Note: Data are average values of d’Agliano Dataset ﬁrms in 1998. Other years yield a similar
picture. Units: Mill. LIT.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Germany.
MNEs Indigenous
Firms
Variables: West: East*: West: East:
Output per Employee 845 687 517 707
Fixed Assets per Employee 1247 1100 901 865
Material Imputs per Employee 580 440 337 500
Employees 1662 2036 999 534
Average Wage Cost/ Employee 127 108 79 72
Note: Data are average values within Amadeus Dataset for German ﬁrms in 1998. Other
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Figure 6: Growth in Productivity, National Firms 1993-98
42Table 3: First Stage Regressions.
Dep. variable: Firm Sales
Country Italy Germany
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Employment 0.17** 0.17** 0.27** 0.26**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.016) (0.016)
Capital 0.03** 0.03** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.12)
Material 0.78** 0.78** 0.58** 0.58**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012)
Foreign owned 0.02** 0.12***
(0.004) (0.015)
Indigenous Firm -0.019** -0.13**
in Poor Regions (-0.002) (-0.04)
MNE in Poor -0.007** -0.026**
Region (0.01) (0.024)
MNE in Rich 0.019** 0.118**
Region (0.001) (0.0013)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (%) 98 98 92 92
Observations 153 992 153 992 5132 5132
Note: *, **, indicate the signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported year dummies
and intercept are always included. Poor regions are the Eastern Laender in Germany and
the Mezzogiorno in Italy. All variables are in logs except dummies. Estimates on Germany
are WLS estimations with weight construction explained in the appendix.
43Table 4: Replicating spillover regressions with MNE employment shares.
Dep. variable: Firm Sales of Indigenous Firms
Country Italy Germany
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Employment 0.17** 0.14** 0.19** 0.22**
(0.0008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009)
Capital 0.03** 0.03** 0.26** 0.29**
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.015) (0.008)
Material 0.78** 0.78** 0.52** 0.45**
(0.0009) (0.004) (0.014) (0.007)
MNE employment 0.018** 0.003 0.78** -0.36
share (0.003) (0.006) (0.16) (0.71)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies Yes No No No
Region Dummies Yes No No No
Firm Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes
R2 (%) 98 99 93 93
Observations 147 809 147 809 3823 3823
Note: *, **, indicate the signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported year dummies
and intercept are always included. All variables are in logs except dummies and MNE
employment share. No correction for weights are made in regressions on Germany.
44Table 5: Second Stage Regressions for Italy.
Dep. variable: Average Productivity Growth of Indigenous Firms
Estimation: OLS IV
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Initial Productivity -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.06***
indigenous ﬁrms (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gap 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.020* 0.019*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
MNE density -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.004)
R2 (%) 50 50 45 45
Observations 483 483 447 447
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported intercept is
always included. Instruments: initial productivity, gap and productivity growth obtained
from ﬁrst stage regressions with average wage cost per employee as dependent variable, the
log of referendum participation in 1974 and the log of murder cases in 1985. Observations
are indexed by sector and province.
45Table 6: Second Stage Regression Robustness Check for Italy.
Dep. variable: Average Productivity Growth of Indigenous Firms
Estimation: OLS IV
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Initial Productivity -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.15** -0.92
indigenous ﬁrms (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (19.30)
Gap 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.004)
MNE density -0.007 -0.002 0.014 -0.47
(0.006) (0.005) (0.040) (11.03)
log referendum 1974 -0.08**
(0.04)
log murder 1985 -0.02
(0.02)
log illiterate 1991 -0.0005
(0.001)




Province Dummies No Yes No No
R2 (%) 48 73
Obs 452 483 420 420
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported intercept is
always included. Instrument: gap-variable. Observations are indexed by sector and province.
46Table 7: Second Stage Regressions for Germany.
Dep. variable: Average Productivity Growth of Indigenous Firms
Estimation: OLS IV
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Initial Productivity -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.48* -0.59
indigenous ﬁrms (0.11) (0.13) (0.25) (0.48)
lagged gap 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.63* 0.59*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.33) (0.30)
lagged log MNE density 0.006 0.015
(0.02) (0.042)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (%) 41 41 21 22
Obs 86 86 82 82
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported intercept is
always included. Initial productivity and MNE density are in logs. Instruments: one period-
lagged Initial GDP per capita, productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms and MNEs obtained
from ﬁrst stage regressions with average wage cost per employee as dependent variable.
Observations are indexed by region and year.
47Table 8: Second Stage Regression Robustness Check for Germany.
Dep. variable: Average Productivity Growth of Indigenous Firms
Estimation: OLS IV OLS AR(1)
Speciﬁcation: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Initial Productivity -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.47*** 0.06
indigenous ﬁrms (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.29)
Gap 0.25** 0.22*** 0.89***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.32)
MNE density -0.002 -0.03 -0.24*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.13)
Lagged log share of university 0.09*
graduates in population (0.05)




lagged ratio of FDI stock 0.015
and total capital stock (0.018)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes No
R2 (%) 54 42
Obs 70 86 80 69
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten, ﬁve, and one percent level, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Unreported intercept is
always included. Instrument for employment growth: gap-variable. AR(1): Arellano and
Bond (1991) dynamic-panel estimator with one time lag of dependent variable; Observations
are indexed by Land and year.
48Table 9: Absorptive Capacity.
Dep. variable: Average TFP growth of indigenous ﬁrms
Country: Germany Italy
Speciﬁcation: Above threshold Below Threshold Above threshold Below Threshold
gap 0.16** 0.24** 0.04*** 0.01***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.01) (0.005)
MNE density 0.02 -0.0004
(0.02) (0.0003)
initial TFP -0.60*** -0.07***
(0.19) (0.01)
constant 1.7*** 1.65*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.53) (0.52) (0.01) (0.02)
Threshold Value of -2.25 0.023
HUMCAP
Sup-Wald Test 5.46 9.54
(0.37) (0.21)
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.00*** 0.00***
Joint R2 (%) 54.1 49.5
Obs 52 21 241 212
Note: ***, **, * indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent
level, respectively. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Italian
observations are by region and 2-digit industry classiﬁcation. Unreported province dummies
are included for Italy. They are signiﬁcant according to an F-test: Threshold variable is
the share of population with university degree lagged one year for Germany and in the year
1981 for Italy; Only the gap variable and the constant are allowed to vary across the sample
halfs; Sup-Wald Test for signiﬁcance of threshold: See Hanson (2000); Marginal probability
in parenthesis is obtained from a bootstrap with 1000 replications; Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroscedasticity.
49